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DISTRIBUTED STOVL OPER ATIONS AND
AIR-MOBILIT Y SUPPORT
Addressing the Mismatch between Requirements and
Capabilities
Robert C. Owen

T

his article examines the logistical support requirements of distributed shorttakeoff–vertical-landing (STOVL) operations (DSOs) by U.S. Marine Corps
F-35B Lightning II fighters, and alternative solutions to fulfilling those requirements. As presently envisioned by Marine planners, DSOs will improve the operational flexibility, survivability, and lethality of F-35Bs by operating them from
constantly shifting networks of mobile forward arming and refueling points (MFARPs). Current Marine Corps planning calls for deployed Marine expeditionary
brigades (MEBs) to support DSOs both from the
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possible range of places that Marine Corps and combatant commanders might
want to establish M-FARPs. Given the possibility that DSOs may offer the best,
or even the only, opportunity to base fifth-generation fighters forward in strong
A2/AD environments, the value of assessing these logistical alternatives is clear.
From an operational and logistical perspective, it is important to understand
that sustained and successful DSOs will draw on the support of other Marine
and joint forces and operations. Deception operations in the form of decoy facilities, along with counterintelligence signals and misinformation, will degrade
and delay enemy efforts to locate and target active DSO elements with enough
certainty to justify releases against them of high-value, short-supply weapons
systems. Marine and host-nation security, combat-engineering, and logistics support will be needed to defend and sustain DSO units in the presence of differing
combinations of enemy air and ground threats. F-35Bs operating from M-FARPs
will often achieve their best successes as elements of broader air-component
information, surveillance, reconnaissance, counterair and air-defense missile,
and counterair operations. Although operating F-35Bs from M-FARPs could
reduce demands on air-refueling (AR) forces, tanker support also can enhance
the operational advantages of forward basing. Thus, while this article focuses on
M-FARP logistics, logistical and operational planners should be aware of the full
contexts and costs of such operations.
CONCEPT AND OPERATIONAL VIABILITY
Marine Corps planners expect DSOs to enhance the depth and power of F-35B
operations through frequent and unpredictable relocation of their bases. More
specifically, the 2015 Marine Aviation Plan explains that “DSO asymmetrically
moves inside of the enemy targeting cycle by using multiple mobile forward
arming and refueling points . . . [u]sing existing infrastructure (multi-lane roads,
small airfields, damaged main bases) . . . [to provide] strategic depth and operational resiliency to the joint force . . . [and provide] the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) with game-changing strategic access inside of the enemy
weapons engagement zone.”1 The success of the concept, therefore, rests on the
ability of Marine commanders to shift force elements among networks of austere
bases faster than enemies can locate, target, and release attacks against them.2
These MAGTF assets may include actual and decoy M-FARPs, sea bases, mobile
distribution sites (MDSs) linking sea bases to M-FARPs logistically, and the full
range of MAGTF air transport, amphibious craft, and trucks to maintain robust
supply flows.3
Consider a conflict with China in the western Pacific as a potential—although
one hopes an unlikely—worst case. This scenario offers insight into the viability
of the DSO concept. Most importantly, China’s capacity to launch long-range
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/6
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FIGURE 1
CURRENT-CONCEPT M-FARP LAYDOWN MAP
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strikes against fleeting targets decreases significantly over distance. (1) Out to
about four hundred nautical miles (nm) from its land bases, China can launch
powerful, robust, all-capabilities (cyber, space, air, naval, and special-operations)
“gorilla” strikes.4 These capabilities draw on magazines of about twelve hundred
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), several hundred medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs), hundreds of cruise missiles, and around 2,100 (six hundred
modern) combat aircraft. (2) Beyond the “gorilla ring,” however, China’s strike
capabilities shrink to its MRBMs and cruise missiles, a few squadrons of medium bombers, and whatever fighter forces its limited AR fleet can project. (3)
Beyond a thousand miles from the homeland, China’s standoff strike capabilities
are limited to cruise missiles carried by surface ships, submarines, and handfuls
of air-refueled bombers, all operating at great risk in contested battle zones and
generally far from their weapons-reload facilities.
China’s ability to provide timely targeting data for M-FARP attacks also decreases quickly with increased distance from the homeland. Within the range of
gorilla strikes, for example, China could search for DSO forces with a layered and
robust network of information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
These would include satellite-borne radar, optical, and other sensors; seaborne
and airborne line-of-sight radar and optical systems; special operations forces
(SOF); local fifth columnists; and even news reporters looking for scoops. Although some or all of these capabilities would be vulnerable to degradation or
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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destruction by U.S. and allied attacks, they could for some periods provide nearcontinual, although not always detailed, surveillance of selected areas of interest.
Beyond the gorilla ring, however, China’s ISR capabilities would reside in a
less-complete array of systems. These would consist of space and airborne systems, which would be sporadic, limited, or both in their ability to detect small
and fleeting targets and subject to interference or interdiction; over-the-horizon,
high-frequency radars, which are limited in their locational accuracy and target
discrimination; and perhaps SOF and fifth-column elements, which would operate under significant limitations on their movements and communications.5
Even in the face of an enemy possessing a strong suite of these capabilities, such
as China, the Marine DSO study anticipates that the daily shifting of actual and
decoy M-FARPs could allow them to evade detection for six to nine hours from
the time they set up for a new day’s operations.6 Given the frequent relocations of
these FARPs, the short ti me spans for which aircraft would occupy them, and the
ability of M-FARP ground crews to disperse aircraft service points at random, information that was six to nine hours old would be stale and unusable for targeting
long-range systems at M-FARPs with any confidence of actually hitting anything
of value. Under such circumstances, DSO forces could do their jobs and survive.
Finally, some assessments of China’s decision-making and command-andcontrol (C2) cultures offer additional hope for the success of DSOs. Given the
limited supply and strategic importance of China’s long-range missile and aircraftattack systems, there is good reason to anticipate that the country’s leaders would
be reluctant to expend them on elusive M-FARPs that might or might not have
aircraft on them when their warheads struck. They might think it better to hold
back those weapons for use against targets of greater operational and strategic
value, such as C2 centers, major air bases, aircraft carriers, supply ships, and
fixed surface-to-air missile sites. Also, a number of experts on Chinese strategic
issues recognize significant disconnects in trust, understanding, goals, and coordination between and within Chinese civil and military elites. These disconnects
could delay or block weapons-release decisions against difficult or lesser-value
targets.7 For instance, civil leaders determined to preserve the deterrent value of
the few hundred DF-21 MRBMs in their arsenal might refuse military requests
to use them in speculative attacks against troublesome M-FARPs. In a major
conflict, these weapon-management and civil-military disconnects probably
would not provide reliable sanctuary for DSO units, but they might help delay or
minimize the frequency, weight, and timeliness of attacks against them.
LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES
Given reasonable expectations that DSOs can be executed successfully, logistics
emerges as a critical challenge to the concept’s viability. DSOs involve a lot of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/6
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FIGURE 2
AIR MOBILITY–SUPPORTED M-FARP LAYDOWN MAP
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moving parts, substantial supply requirements, and shifting lines of communication. The recent Marine Corps study of the organic transportation assets available
to a MEB to support DSOs reveals just how big and complex the logistical challenge can be (see figure 2).
The study was based on a reinforced complement of thirty-six F-35Bs operating from a MEB sea base or an expeditionary airfield and supported by an
onshore network of three MDSs, each supporting an operational M-FARP, plus
one setting up and another breaking down.8 For logistics-planning purposes, the
study postulated that the air-combat element would launch twenty-eight aircraft
daily, each flying an initial combat air patrol sortie, refueling and rearming at an
M-FARP, flying another sortie, resetting again at an M-FARP, flying a third sortie,
and then recovering to the sea base. Each F-35 would load missiles and six tons of
fuel after each sortie. Together, then, the three M-FARPs would require resupply
of 336 tons of fuel and up to 280 tons of containerized munitions each day.
Depending on the number of transportation and other vehicles deployed
ashore to connect the MDSs to their M-FARPs, and on whether the F-35s bedded down on the sea base or an expeditionary airfield ashore, the total tonnage
of fuel required to support the ground and air elements of DSOs would range
from 544 to 1,337 tons per day, plus the nonfuel sustainment requirements of
shore complements ranging from eight hundred to eighteen hundred personnel.9
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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FIGURE 3
NOTIONAL F-35B COMBAT AIR PATROL SCHEDULE
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Source: System Planning and Analysis, “STOVL Operations,” p. 37.

Whatever the basing model, satisfying these requirements likely would consume
the lift capacity of almost all of a MEB’s rotary-wing transport aircraft (CH-53Ks
and MV-22s), amphibious craft, and trucks.10
Consequently, relying on MEB organic transportation assets to support DSOs
could pose significant operational risks for Marine and joint commanders. Most
importantly, tying DSOs to organic capabilities could limit the operational flexibility and overall responsiveness of the MAGTF in an unfolding campaign.
Tailoring the MAGTF to support such an unusually large complement of F-35s
likely would require leaving some of its normal complements of air- and groundcombat and support assets and personnel ashore to make room for additional
F-35Bs and their support equipment and personnel. That, and the debarkation
of so many vehicles and personnel ashore, could increase the time needed for the
MAGTF to reconfigure and deploy for other missions elsewhere in a theater of
operations.
An “organic” approach to DSO support also would increase the vulnerability
of sea bases and transportation connectors to detection and attack. Trucks driving perhaps hundreds of miles between MDSs and shifting M-FARPs would be
subject to the normal hazards of travel on sometimes primitive road systems,
and vulnerable to long-range attacks at choke points and to harassment by SOF
and locals sympathetic or beholden to the enemy. The short operating ranges of
amphibious craft and CH-53 and MV-22 rotary-wing aircraft carrying externally
slung loads of fuel bladders and missile containers would restrict the maneuver
space available to ships in the sea base to within twenty-five to fifty nautical miles
of their supported MDSs.11 Thus, enemies detecting the presence of M-FARPs in
an area would not have very far to look for their support ships, MDSs, and choke
points along surface lines of communication. Reasonably, they would realize
that striking those relatively fixed and thus vulnerable targets would be a more
remunerative strategy for shutting down DSOs than expending precious ISR and
long-range strike assets to snipe at elusive M-FARPs.
OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING LOGISTICAL RISKS
There are at least three options for reducing the logistical risks inherent in DSOs.
First, the Marine Corps could increase the size of supporting sea bases. For
example, adding the twenty-aircraft capacity of an America-class amphibious
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/6
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assault ship (LHA) to a sea base could allow a MEB to support expanded F-35B
operations with minimal reconfiguration of its other ships. The MEB, consequently, would remain ready for quick application to other missions.
Second, the Marines could allocate KC-130Js to carry some or all aviation
sustainment supplies directly into supported M-FARPs. The KC-130s’ ability to
operate on multilane highways, damaged air bases, or unpaved airstrips would
allow them to deliver support directly to or very near almost any location employed by F-35Bs. The advantages of this approach would be a reduction in shore
complements and the risks associated with surface transportation between MDSs
and M-FARPs.
The third option would be for Marines to draw on Air Force air-mobility assets to provide direct or near-direct support to the M-FARPs. The obvious advantage of this is that the air component’s tanker and transport forces have greater
range and capacity than organic Marine lift assets.
Each of these options offers significant advantages to DSO planners; but they
also present significant concerns.
Expanding sea bases to support F-35B operations would present commanders
with several operational and risk challenges. The first is finding a “spare” LHA
and supporting ships somewhere in the world that could arrive on the scene of
DSOs in a timely manner without imposing offsetting risks on the readiness of
other MAGTFs. However, even presuming that operational urgency justified
such a move, expanding a sea base would not mitigate the vulnerability of its
ships or of the MEB’s transportation assets ashore to long-range attack. In short,
bringing in additional ships would be more about preserving the flexibility and
responsiveness of the MAGTF than about improving the viability of DSOs.
FIGURE 4

Two J-35Bs prepare to refuel from a Marine KC-130J
USMC photo
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Although applying Marine KC-130Js to M-FARP support could both enhance
MAGTF readiness and reduce risks, the Marine airlift fleet generally is inadequate
to the task. C-130J payload-distance characteristics often will fall short of need
in theaters that are geographically expansive, such as the Asia-Pacific and Africa.
For illustration, “Js” flying unrefueled, 2,800 nm round-trip missions between
Tinian, an island outside the range of China’s current MRBMs and land-based
cruise missiles, and M-FARPs on the Philippine island of Luzon could deliver a
maximum load of fifteen tons per sortie. C-130s operating from expeditionary
bases outside the range of Chinese gorilla strikes but within range of heavy missile attacks—say, over the 1,380 nm round-trip between General Santos Airport
in southern Mindanao and the Luzon M-FARPs—could deliver twenty-two tons
per sortie. From a conservative estimate that air transports would have to deliver
about 666 tons of cargo per day (336 for aviation fuel, 280 for munitions, fifty
for all else), the impact of the distances involved and the C-130’s payload-range
performance becomes clear. On the basis of the data in table 1, a presumption of
only one sortie per day per aircraft, and an 80 percent aircraft availability rate, the
Marines would have to deploy fifty-six of their worldwide fleet of around sixty
KC-130Js to support the Luzon M-FARPs. Assuming the same data, except now
a two-sortie-per-day rate, twenty-eight C-130s would be needed to support the
mission from Mindanao. Moreover, those C-130 units probably would have to
conduct their own version of DSOs to survive operations within the enemy missile ring, with all the logistical burdens that would imply.12
It is also worth considering that, while the cargo decks of KC-130s would be
capable of accommodating all the sustainment supplies and most of the vehicles
M-FARPs would need, they would not be capable of handling some critical assets. These would include LVSR SIXCON refuelers (critical for getting fuel across
rough terrain), fully assembled seven-ton trucks, and all-terrain forklifts. They
also could not carry slat-armored light assault vehicles and some civil engineering equipment that might be needed to open and defend M-FARPs and lines
of communication. The reality is that the Marine C-130 fleet is too small and
limited in its cargo-handling features to deploy and sustain DSOs fully under the
circumstances discussed above.
At first glance, the big transports and tanker/transports in the Air Force’s
global fleet appear to be a ready solution to the problem of reducing risks to
sea bases and personnel during DSOs. Consisting of around 220 C-17 and 350
C-130 transports and fifty-nine KC-10 and four hundred KC-135 tankers, with
KC-46 tankers to be added soon, the gross capacity of the mobility fleet dwarfs
the most ambitious DSO requirements. Ten KC-46s flying 1.5 missions per day
out of Tinian, for instance, could satisfy the 666-ton logistical requirements of
the notional Luzon M-FARPs, and offer the added flexibility of aerial refueling.13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/6
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Flying the same profiles, seven C-17s could do the job, although without offering the AR option. In combination, then, relatively small numbers of Air Force
air-mobility aircraft could obviate the need to keep sea bases close to shore and
to put hundreds of Marines at risk driving and protecting trucks between MDSs
and M-FARPs.
Unfortunately, the interplay of the payload-range and airfield infrastructure
requirements of the Air Force’s current and planned air-mobility fleet would
limit its ability to support directly the austere M-FARP clusters favored by DSO
planners. The big C-17s in the fleet can bring a lot of fuel and supplies into
short and unsurfaced or weakly paved runways; however, just a few landing and
takeoff passes will render such airstrips unusable through rutting and gouging.14
Air Force C-130s could get into most M-FARPs, but they would suffer the same
range, payload, and cargo-dimension limitations as their Marine cousins. Even
worse, from a DSO perspective, all Air Force long-range tankers are modified
airliners. As such, they are efficient load carriers, but capable of operating only
from first-class airfields possessing long, hard-surfaced runways, taxiways, and
parking areas. In many cases, therefore, joint air components will not be capable
of transporting adequate amounts of cargo and fuel over theater distances and delivering them directly into M-FARPs. To the extent that these shortfalls in direct
delivery capacity oblige MAGTF commanders still to put people and vehicles on
the ground to move supplies from MDSs and big airfields to M-FARPs, the opportunities offered by air mobility to enhance operational flexibility and reduce
risks will be lost.
MITIGATING THE AIR-MOBILITY SHORTFALL
Despite its present limitations, the potential of air-mobility support to mitigate
the operational and logistical risks of DSOs justifies a search for ways to mitigate
its inadequacies in support of M-FARPs. Of course, to be useful in the current
financial environment, any opportunity considered must prima facie promise to
improve operational capabilities significantly while imposing minimal or even
reduced burdens on defense budgets.
These considerations suggest at least two courses of action worth pursuing.
First, Marine and Air Force logistical and operational experts must figure
out how to get the most from the existing air-mobility fleet in the DSO context.
This effort must include studies, discussions, and exercises that examine the full
operational, logistical, and threat contexts of DSOs in the presence of moderateto-high A2/AD threats. Such a learning process would improve the ability of all
parties to use creative combinations of Marine and Air Force lift assets to conduct
DSOs in a wider range of places than currently possible, and burden the budget
only with the costs of thinking and training.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/6
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Second, the joint community should consider adjusting the air-mobility fleet
to include an increment of aircraft better suited to support DSOs. At minimum,
such an aircraft should have payload-range and cargo cabin dimensions suitable
for transporting all DSO logistical requirements over strategic distances (meaning from bases outside the range of all, or at least most, enemy missile and aircraft
strikes) and delivering them directly to or very near M-FARPs. Support from
such an aircraft would allow Marine commanders to conduct maximal DSOs
from the widest range of locations. Such aircraft also would improve the mobility
fleet’s capacity to support other operations requiring logistical throughput directly to points of need/employment, such as Army and Marine deep-maneuver
operations, and resupply of air bases damaged or under the threat of damage by
enemy A2/AD operations.15 The utility and survivability of such a system would
be further enhanced if it also possessed AR capabilities.
CASE STUDY
This section presents a case study to illustrate the leverage provided by a mediumweight, austere airfield–capable tanker/transport aircraft to DSOs. It is simplistic;
clearly a full analysis of all the relevant mobility options available is beyond the
scope of this article. But by providing an analysis of the effect of integrating Airbus A400Ms into DSOs, it should at least illustrate the value of this type of aircraft
to operations in regions characterized by sparse airfield infrastructures.
The A400M is an “outsize” military transport/tanker aircraft capable of operating into virtually any airfield or multilane highway strip usable by the C-130.
FIGURE 5

A400M in flight
Courtesy of Airbus
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In airlift parlance, outsize
refers to an aircraft that
has larger cargo deck
cross-section dimensions than a standard
militar y 463L cargo
pallet. In this case, the
A400’s cabin, including the loading ramp, is
74ʹ length × 13ʹ width
× 12.6ʹ height (miniA400M refueling F-18s
mum), while a standardAirbus Defense and Space 2015; Photo by Master Films / A. Doumenjou, used with permission
length Marine C orps
C-130J’s similar dimensions are 50ʹ × 10ʹ × 9ʹ, including the loading ramp. The A400M’s greater internal
volume and up to forty-one-ton payload enable it to carry all the logistic vehicles,
engineering equipment, and combat vehicles that DSOs are likely to require.
A400s provide a valid—and, realistically speaking, an unavoidable—baseline
for this analysis, not because it is impossible to imagine a better design for DSO
support, but because A400s offer the only option in this class of aircraft likely to
be available to the U.S. Air Force for the next twenty or more years. The moribund Antonov AN-70 and the developmental Xian Y-20 are in the same class as
the A400M, but are not likely candidates for the United States to acquire. For its
part, the Air Force abandoned successful programs to develop outsize, shorttakeoff-or-landing transports, the YC-14 and YC-15, in the late 1970s in favor of
developing the C-17, a design that represented a greater trade-off of short-field
capabilities for increased range and payload. While the service has studied the
issue numerous times since, it has taken no concrete action to develop a new
type of theater airlifter. Similarly, tanker aircraft based on repurposed airliner
designs are not suitable. Importantly, one of the Air Force’s most recent assessments of options for acquiring a new theater airlifter found that even a modest
acquisition program carried thirty-year life-cycle costs of $62–$128 billion. The
Air Force’s study also found that purchasing an outsize “conventional takeoff and
landing” aircraft (one possessing performance characteristics similar to those of
the A400M) was the least expensive near-term option for enhancing support for
Army deep-maneuver forces, apart from simply buying more C-17s and C-130s.16
So, the analysis below is based on the A400M, in full awareness that the other
option—building a new aircraft—remains on the table, although the experience
of acquiring the C-17 suggests it could take ten to fifteen or more years from
program approval to get the first squadron operationally ready.
FIGURE 6
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The case examined here is postulated on an escalating conflict over Chinese
base building and oil drilling in the South China Sea, and efforts by the commander of U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) to deter Chinese action.
In such a situation, if deterrence fails, CDRUSPACOM will want to have forces
postured to seize the operational initiative anywhere along the Pacific Rim. Accordingly, CDRUSPACOM orders his Marine component commander to posture
his on-scene MEB to support a reinforced component of thirty-six F-35Bs for
high-intensity DSOs from a network of M-FARPs (see figure 2) on the island
of Luzon. These operations could range from presence patrols over the central
South China Sea to strike operations on its periphery. The PACOM commander
further orders that the F-35Bs available be deployed as rapidly as possible, even as
the MEB continues its organization and embarkation activities at Guam. Seeking
further to preserve the readiness of the MEB for rapid movements in response
to unfolding events, CDRUSPACOM directs his air-component commander to
deploy an expeditionary group of A400Ms to an agile base complex around the
Bohol Sea area to deploy and sustain DSO units and operations to the north.17
As part of this commitment, the A400M force also will conduct AR operations in
the vicinity of refueling track 1 (RT 1), west of the F-35B FARP complex. As soon
as possible, the MEB and its sea base position themselves in a relatively secure
maneuver area east of the central Philippines, from where rotary-wing assets can
move relief personnel, fresh food, aircraft parts, and other light items to and from
the M-FARPs.
Given this complex set of requirements, the Marines would posture their DSO
force to reflect the robust air-mobility support available. Accordingly, the force
laydown does not include MDSs and long road lines of communication between
them and the M-FARPs. Few or no dedicated long-haul transportation assets go
ashore. Instead, the Marine commander plans on air-deploying four complete
M-FARP teams from Guam to Luzon, each postured to support up to twentyfour F-35B sorties per day from highway airstrips, and possessing the organic
transportation assets needed to be fully mobile, including rolling storage of a
day’s supply of fuel and munitions. With all assets and supplies on vehicles, each
M-FARP team is capable of breaking down and departing an M-FARP site in one
hour, driving up to twenty miles to a new site in another hour, and setting back up
for operations in a third hour. Thus, each M-FARP is expected to shift locations at
least daily. Generally, any two M-FARP teams can support the pace of sustained
F-35B patrol operations while the others are in motion or resting their personnel.
All might be required to support offensive and defensive surges, but only for a few
hours per day. The general complement of each M-FARP team is 150–60 personnel, four heavy LVSR SIXCON refueling trucks, sixteen seven-ton cargo trucks,
eight MK970 five-thousand-gallon refueling trailers, thirty-three vehicles of the
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high-mobility multipurpose vehicle type, a large all-terrain forklift, and about a
dozen miscellaneous trailers.18
The A400Ms working out of the Bohol Sea area turn out to be well suited to
the mission of supporting DSOs. About twenty-eight A400M sorties suffice to
move the 750 tons or so of vehicles and supplies needed to put an M-FARP in
place and ready for the first day’s operation.19 A modest commitment of twenty
A400Ms based around the Bohol Sea area could transport the first M-FARP team
from Guam to Luzon in twenty-four hours, and move all four teams in just over
three days. Once full-scale operations began, as few as ten to twelve A400M sorties per day could deliver the 666 tons of daily replenishment supplies needed by
the M-FARP teams to support a combined daily tempo of twenty-eight F-35B
missions, each stopping twice at an M-FARP to pick up full loads of fuel and munitions (see figure 3). Further, since these aircraft deliver their loads directly to,
or very near to, the FARPs, their use eliminates the need to keep sea bases close
inshore for their short-range amphibious and rotary-wing connectors to supplement the bulk logistics flow, and they eliminate the need for long, potentially
vulnerable overland supply routes.
In comparison with the scenario laid out above, an effort to move and sustain
this force by a combination of C-17s and C-130s would be more complex, would
involve more sorties, and would increase operational risk. Moving the four MFARP teams from Guam directly to their initial operational locations would
require approximately 176 KC-130 sorties, plus a significant number of A400Ms
or C-17s to move vehicles too large or too heavy to fit into a C-130.20 Relying on
C-17s to deploy the M-FARP teams and their daily supply requirements would
greatly reduce the required sorties for the mission; but there are only eight developed airfields on Luzon capable of handling C-17s on a sustained basis; all are in
or near major cities; and most have limited parking areas.21 So aircraft flying into
them on a repetitive basis would be visible to hundreds of thousands of people
with cell phones, including many enemy nationals, and they would park at easily
predicted and targeted spots.22 Conducting sustained resupply operations into
those airfields would undermine the flexibility and security of the MAGTF and
its sea base by obliging it to debark substantial numbers of vehicles and personnel to transport supplies out to M-FARPs that could be a hundred miles or more
away from an active aerial port of debarkation. A DSO logistics concept based
on even minimal use of major airfields, therefore, might force sea bases back
inshore to support the increased supply flows incumbent in the enlarged ground
transportation effort, or drastically increase the amount of airlift required. In
either case, much of the logistical, operational, and security benefits to be gained
by bringing Air Force air-mobility aircraft into the picture would be lost.
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An additional benefit of operating outsize transport/tankers from the agile base
network around the Bohol Sea would be the
availability of AR support for the F-35Bs.
RT 1
Presuming, as an example, a sequence of
F-35B FARP
three four-plane formations taking off at
complex
one-hour intervals to provide continuous coverage in one area, and potentially
expending their advanced medium-range
air-to-air missiles (i.e., AMRAAMs) on each
sortie, the operational profile could look like
Sea base
this: each formation would depart the sea
base, top off its fuel from A400Ms at RT 1
(see figure 7), patrol for one hour, proceed
to an M-FARP for fuel and reloads, proceed
Tanker agilebasing complex
back to its patrol area for an hour, return
again to the M-FARP, patrol again for fortyfive minutes, top off at RT 1, and then fly
back to the sea base. Flying this pattern, the
200 nm
three formations would produce 2.8 hours
of on-station time for each flight and cover the patrol area for 8.5 hours. For their
part, the tankers would land at the M-FARPs as necessary to off-load munitions
and recharge fuels-support vehicles. The basic logistics effort would be as follows.

7
FARP SCENARIO MAP

Munitions required at M-FARPs

117 tons

Fuel required at M-FARPs

106 tons

AR fuel required (before first orbit and after last)

77 tons

Using the data in table 1, the chart below reflects the comparative capabilities of the A400M and the KC-130J to support this scenario from the Bohol Sea
area.
Aircraft

A400M

KC-130J

Sorties required

9

18

Aircraft required

7

15

333

384

Fuel consumed by tanker/transport aircraft (thousand lbs.)
Ratio of fuel consumed / delivered to F-35Bs
Required tanker/transport parking spots at each M-FARP
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LIGHTNING RAIDS
Before summarizing the implications of this discussion of the integration of
common-user air-mobility support into the DSO concept, it will be valuable
to consider an important variation on that theme: the raid. There is a long history of air forces extending the practical depth of their offensive operations by
teaming transports and tactical aircraft to establish temporary operating locations from which to conduct small-scale raids deep into enemy territories. The
Marines, of course, are zealous practitioners of the art. Recently, the U.S. Air
Force and Royal Air Force (RAF) have revived their interests in this concept.
USAF experiments with the “Rapid-X” concept involve pairing two to four
fighters with a single C-17 carrying the personnel, equipment, fuel, and munitions needed to generate sorties from isolated locations. Often this team would
conduct operations in a “flex basing” mode: sitting at a particular airfield just
long enough to launch a few sorties, then moving on to another location—
always a step ahead of an enemy’s targeting cycle.23 Similarly, the RAF has received briefings from Airbus Defense and Space Corporation on using A400Ms
to support forward fighter operations. In the Airbus scenario, an individual
A400M or teams of them would deploy to austere, forward airfields, each with
enough fuel and munitions to regenerate two to four fighters for an additional
strike sortie. By eliminating return trips to distant main bases for rearming, this
concept can nearly double the number of strike sorties available from a given
force of F-35Bs over given spans of time, while nearly halving the amount of fuel
burned.24
Once again, medium-weight, short-field tanker/transport aircraft offer attractive opportunities to exploit these linked transport-fighter and forwardoperating-location concepts. Teams of A400M-equivalent aircraft and F-35Bs
could operate into and from asphalt and concrete runways and highway strips of
four thousand feet in length or less, presuming the fighters used vertical-rollingtakeoff-and-landing (VRL) procedures.25 A pairing of C-17s and conventionaltakeoff-and-landing F-35As and Cs, in comparison, would need runways approximately seven thousand feet in length for conventional fighter takeoffs and
landings, and with high load-bearing capacities to accommodate the heavy transports. C-130s can match the airfield performance of the A400M, of course, but
their operational radii generally would be smaller in support of DSOs, and they
would require more sorties to support a given effort.
IMPLICATIONS
Particularly if they are augmented by medium-weight, austere airfield–capable
tanker/transports, the potential benefits of using Air Force air-mobility forces to
support DSOs include these:
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1. Providing a flexible and reliable option for supporting DSOs in a wide
range of situations
2. Preserving the operational readiness of an embarked MEB by substantially
reducing the size of the onshore forces needed to support DSOs
3. Reducing the vulnerability of the sea base and onshore forces to A2/AD
threats
4. Reducing the need to move carrier battle groups into forward threat zones
to extend their strike range, contribute to extended deterrence, or protect
Marines ashore
5. Facilitating flexible deterrence by permitting the placement of strong
and survivable air forces inside enemy threat rings; indeed, air mobility–
supported deployments of DSO forces may in many cases be the only
effective means to exploit the short windows of opportunity available to
deter enemy actions that might convert confrontations into wars
6. Improving the effectiveness of the overall air-mobility fleet in support of
DSOs and other important missions, such as supporting land force deepmaneuver and battle-damaged air bases
The way forward seems clear. For a start, Marine DSO and Air Force mobility
planners need to meet, learn each other’s “language” and operational issues, and
then rigorously examine the ability of the program-of-record fleet to support
DSOs in a resilient and operationally effective manner. This discussion should
include Marine and Army ground-warfare experts, since the final answer on
whether the Department of Defense should acquire a new transport aircraft will
rest in part on its relative value to requirements in addition to DSOs.26 Finally—
and particularly if an international design comes into the spotlight—it would not
hurt to involve interested congressional, Defense Department, and civil experts
in the discussion from the start. In the quest for offsets and trade-offs to finance
a new fleet segment, the support of those experts will be important to the outcome of the unavoidable political fights with the stakeholders and proponents
of existing aircraft programs. In other words, this is a big issue, but one that is
strategically important to the warfighting capabilities of the Marines and, indeed,
all the service components.

NOTES
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